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Abstract  In this article, I offer a provisional analysis of the philosophical 
semantics of “wisdom” in the thought of the New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi. 
I begin by providing some pointers concerning the concept of wisdom in general 
and situating the discourse on wisdom in comparative philosophy in the context 
of the later Foucault’s and Pierre Hadot’s historical investigations into ancient 
Graeco-Roman philosophy as a mode of spiritual self-cultivation and 
self-transformation. In the remainder of the paper, I try to describe and think 
through what Foucault identifies as a “Cartesian moment,” in which 
self-knowledge becomes the ultimate precondition for the ethico-spiritual project 
of “caring for the self,” in Tang’s approach of wisdom. In the course of my 
argument, I outline the complex relation between his vision of a renewed 
Confucian mode of religious practice on the one hand and his philosophical 
presuppositions concerning the transcendental status of subjectivity and the 
reflexivity of consciousness on the other. 
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1  Introduction 
In a collection of notes dating from around 1958, the modern Confucian 
philosopher Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–78) makes the following statement in 
which a number of concepts are strung together to the point of collapsing into 
each other and becoming indistinguishable: “[One should] nurture wisdom 
through life, replenish existence through wisdom, and open up life through 
knowledge, for life and existence are the matrix of learning” (以生活滋養智慧, 
以智慧潤澤生命, 以知識開拓生活, 生活、生命為學問之模胎) (Tang [ca. 1958], 
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49). In the following pages, I will try to gradually unfold the dense “matrix” 
Tang invokes here by focusing on the import of the idea of “wisdom” (zhihui 智
慧), which he treats interchangeably with “knowledge” (zhishi 知識) in this note 
insofar as both wisdom and knowledge maintain a direct connection and 
mutually reinforcing relation with human life and existence as such.1 The 
indeterminacy of the notion of “wisdom” prevents us from identifying it with 
“knowledge” without first making a few observations which are relevant to our 
understanding of the position of wisdom in comparative philosophy in general 
and Tang’s writings in particular.  
 One of the reasons for the overall elusiveness of “wisdom” in Tang’s thought 
is the fact that it is usually not defined directly or positively (if it is defined at all). 
It rather only gains its meaning within a series of oppositions, for example in the 
set of distinctions between practical wisdom (phronēsis), technical know-how 
(technē), and theoretical knowledge (sophia) reaching back to Aristotle.2 In this 
sense, it is far from obvious whether “wisdom” qualifies as a philosophical 
concept to begin with, or rather denotes an existential skill which should be 
sought for in what Tang's friend and fellow Confucian Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 
(1909–95) famously called a “learning of life” (shengming de xuewen 生命的學
問) (Mou 1970). Distinctions between wisdom on the one hand and whatever one 
chooses to distinguish it from on the other (philosophy, science, reason, 
perception, information, prejudice…) can draw on specific theoretical 
conceptions, on everyday language (think of proverbs for example), or on a 
combination of both.  
As a starting point, one can remain content with the assumption that “all of us 
have an intuitive sense of what wisdom means” (Hall 2010, 8). In doing so, 
however, the problem becomes that which is designated by “intuition,” as 
opposed to (mediated) “knowledge,” and precisely what is at stake in drawing 
this distinction while relating wisdom to intuitive understanding in a certain 
discursive and socio-historical context. Additionally, by appealing to 
pretheoretical intuition, the idea of wisdom can come to appear as something of a 
coincidentia oppositorum that combines the characteristics of esoteric 
inaccessibility and everyday obviousness within itself, while leaving these two 
contradictory features unreconciled. If wisdom is directly opposed to “normal” 
(scientific, philosophical, commonsensical,  …) rationality in a general fashion, 
any attempt to provide an analytical, “outsider” definition of what it means to be 
                                                               
1 “Knowledge is like ball of raw silk. When it is soaked in the water of life, it becomes 
translucent, flexible, and pleasing to the eye. But if one day the spring of life were to dry up, 
knowledge too will become as rigid as dried clay.” (知識猶如一團生絲，當浸潤在生活的水中時，
條條清澈，宛轉如畫。但一朝生活的源泉枯竭，知識也就膠結如泥。) (Tang [1939], 23). 
2  “[M]odern languages generally distinguish between theoretical wisdom and practical 
wisdom and retain for wisdom only the practical-ethical meaning” (Cassin 2013, 1242). 
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wise would seem to be forced to capitulate beforehand. One thus remains outside 
of the boundary that the wise are able to draw between themselves and the 
intrusive gaze of a foolish inquisitor who would like to catch a glimpse of what 
the sage can see without having to go through the trouble of becoming one 
himself.  
Obviously, the line of demarcation between “wisdom” and its opposite(s) can 
be drawn in many different ways. Interestingly enough, the invitation or 
instruction to cross or even annul the boundary between wisdom and knowledge 
(or wisdom and folly) is one of the most counterintuitive yet prevalent forms 
taken on by the philosophical discourse on wisdom in both Eastern and Western 
thought (see for example Payer 2004). Wisdom is not knowledge; it is 
non-knowledge, knowing that one does not know, knowing without knowing, 
knowing the unknowable, and so on.  
While it is tempting to become mesmerized by the dizzying dialectical 
gyrations accompanying such paradoxical formulations, we can for the moment 
restrict ourselves to taking a cue from a few elementary observations made by 
the sociologist Alois Hahn which can account for at least some of the paradoxes 
to which accounts of wisdom often give rise. Instead of trying to isolate certain 
features of the kind of knowledge that different cultures and societies throughout 
the ages have characterized as “wise” on the level of content, Hahn opts to 
approach the problem of “wisdom” in a more functional and formal manner, in 
the hope of thereby accommodating the plethora of different conceptions of what 
it means to be wise or act wisely. He proposes that, whatever its specific form of 
appearance in various cultures, religions, philosophies, and everyday language 
may be, “wisdom” always designates a special or exceptional kind of knowledge 
(Sonderwissen) that is characterized by a certain degree of reflexivity and 
self-referentiality, as a “knowing how to know” (Wissenswissen), that is to say, “a 
knowledge concerning how to deal with knowledge” (Hahn 1991, 52, emphasis 
added). In what follows, I will limit myself to providing a brief contextualized 
case study of the reflexivity of “wisdom” in the work of the modern Chinese 
philosopher Tang Junyi. 
2  Wisdom and Philosophy as a Way of Life 
A motif routinely encountered in discussions on the topic of wisdom, specifically 
in the context of comparative philosophy, is the identification of wisdom with a 
form of knowledge which is not present in the knowing subject as a piece of 
content within a container, but rather shapes and transforms the way in which the 
subject perceives, judges, knows, acts, and evaluates as such (see for example 
Ferrerstein 2004, 89). In this sense, wisdom is seen as being concerned with 
human existence as a whole, with knowing and learning how to live, and not 
Ady Van Den Stock 42
merely with the accumulation of information or the acquisition of specialized 
technical knowledge. In other words: “knowing how to know” is inseparable 
from knowing how to live.  
Unsurprisingly, as an academic discipline institutionalized in the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the modern university, it is not uncommon for philosophy to be 
suspected of having become alienated from its originary (and perennial) task of 
constituting a “love of wisdom” (philo-sophia) and of now being burdened with 
the task of restoring the severed bond between knowledge and existence. This is 
precisely the sentiment Tang Junyi expresses when he writes that “philosophical 
and scientific theories as such do not allow human beings to settle themselves 
and establish their lives” (Tang [1956], 309). Accordingly, the distinction 
between wisdom and its other(s) is routinely lodged onto a temporal difference, 
namely that between “timeless wisdom” on the one hand and, on the other, “mere 
(e.g. scientific or technical) knowledge,” as attached to and constrained by the 
specific situation in which it is employed or the problem to which it responds and 
beyond which it is of no use or importance. If interpreted positively, “wisdom” 
thus becomes a form of knowledge that is essentially continuous with the past 
and with tradition, serving to uphold and reactualize (ancient) knowledge outside 
of the specific socio-historical conditions which gave rise to it and ought not to 
keep it captive.3 Contrary to the evanescence of “information,” wisdom is 
assumed to be able to absorb and be enriched by the passing of time, instead of 
being eroded and eventually undone by it.4  
If the problem of cultural difference is added to the close nexus between 
wisdom, existence, and historical continuity, the picture gets even more 
complicated. In the available literature, one encounters both universalistic 
conceptions of wisdom, as a type of knowledge which inherently transcends 
cultural, religious, and disciplinary boundaries,5 as well as more particularistic 
approaches which establish an elective affinity between the idea of wisdom and, 
                                                               
3 For Tang’s one-time teacher Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1899–1977) for example, wisdom 
constitutes the veritable “axis of the cultural life of a people” (民族文化生活之中樞) (Fang 
[1927], 111). Similarly, Li Zehou 李泽厚 treats “the wisdom of China” as synonymous with 
what he calls the “cultural-psychological formation” (wenhua xinli jiegou 文化心理结构) of 
the Chinese people, the latter counting as the product of a historical process of “sedimentation” 
(jidian 积淀) which ensures the persistence of tradition in contemporary society (see Li 1985). 
4 “[W]isdom grows in the transmission of past knowledge and experience. Wisdom is 
enriched through each generation that adds its own knowledge and experience to the 
enterprise” (Yao 2005, 301). 
5 “Wisdom is the ideal state of knowledge… cherished and searched for in all cultural 
traditions East and West… The study of wisdom brings together all these different traditions as 
well as different disciplines, such as religious studies, philosophy, history and social sciences” 
(Shen 2004, vii).  
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for example, “Oriental” traditions in general, or the so-called “Sapiental Books” 
of the Old Testament. 6  According to Barry Allen, for instance, Chinese 
philosophy “does not share the problems of [Western] epistemology because it 
does not share the evaluation of knowledge that makes those problems 
perplexing. Knowledge poses different questions—not about essence or 
conditions of possibility, but about point and value. What makes knowledge wise 
and worth pursuing?” (Allen 2015, 4). Allen sees the whole tradition of Western 
philosophy as being preoccupied with, and ultimately blinded and crippled by, 
what is actually the specifically post-Kantian problem of “access” (how do we 
know reality, can we gain access to what is outside of the knowing subject at all, 
what are the conditions of human knowledge, etc.) instead of paying attention to 
the practical or ethical efficacy and transformative capacity of knowledge as 
wisdom. However, a more nuanced and somewhat different picture begins to 
emerge if we take some basic insights from the researches of the later Michel 
Foucault and the work of Pierre Hadot on ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy into 
account.  
At the beginning of a series of lectures delivered between 1981 and 1982 at the 
Collège de France entitled The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault speculates 
whether one could not symbolically identify what he provisionally and rather 
hesitantly calls a “Cartesian moment” in the history of Western thought, at which 
point the requirement to “take care of the self” (epimeleia heautou) which 
continuously and consistently appeared throughout classical Greek and Roman 
thought became eclipsed by a rationalist incarnation of the famous Delphic 
precept “know yourself” (gnōthi seauton) (Foucault 2006, 12–18). Throughout 
these lectures, Foucault attempts to demonstrate that in classical philosophy, the 
relation between subjectivity and truth was not primarily (let alone exclusively) 
understood as a narrowly cognitive or theoretical one, but rather as 
fundamentally practical, insofar as the subject was expected to change his 
attitude, behavior, and entire way of existence in order to gain “access” to, that is 
to say, be positively affected and transformed by the truth. As such, “knowing 
the self” was part and parcel of, but ultimately remained subordinated to, the 
lifelong and to some extent universal endeavor of “caring for the self.” As 
Foucault stresses, the requirement to “care for oneself” did not yet ring of either 
egotism or narcissism, but was rather closely tied up with conceptions of how to 
                                                               
6 The identification of non-Western philosophy with “wisdom” can appear in a derogatory 
fashion, denoting a lack a systematicity and conceptual rigor, but can also be intended 
positively, indicating a fundamental continuity between existence, experience, and knowledge. 
At times, the description of a philosophical tradition as geared towards “wisdom” serves to 
mete out praise and blame at the same time. For two early examples of the latter tendency in 
Western Sinology, see the remarks by Forke (1927, ix) and Granet (1934, 4–8).  
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effectively participate in communal life and properly govern the polis (Foucault 
2006, 12–13).  
Crucially, such “care of the self” took the form of what Pierre Hadot terms 
“spiritual exercises,” of which what we normally associate with and immediately 
recognize as philosophical speculation was but one example. Hadot uses the term 
“spiritual exercises” to designate “practices which could be physical, as in 
dietary regimes, or discursive, as in dialog and meditation, or intuitive, as in 
contemplation, but which were all intended to effect a modification in the subject 
who practiced them” (Hadot 1995, 6). According to Hadot, such exercises played 
a central role in ancient thought: 
 
Each assertion [in Graeco-Roman philosophy] must be understood from the 
perspective of the effect it was intended to produce in the soul of the auditor or 
reader. Whether the goal was to convert, to console, to cure, or to exhort the 
audience, the point was always and above all not to communicate to them 
some ready-made knowledge, but to form them. In other words, the goal was 
to learn a type of know-how; to develop a habitus, or new capacity to judge 
and to criticize; and to transform—that is, to change people’s way of living 
and of seeing the world. (Hadot 2002, 274)7 
 
On his part, Foucault contrasts “philosophy,” understood as “the form of thought 
that asks what it is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which 
attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the subject's access to the 
truth” (Foucault 2006, 15), with the “spirituality” found in the philosophy of 
Greek and Roman antiquity, the latter counting as “the search, practice, and 
experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations 
on himself in order to have access to the truth” (Foucault 2006, 15). Foucault 
claims that, from the point of view of spirituality, “there can be no truth without 
a conversion or a transformation of the subject” (Foucault 2006, 15).8 With 
Descartes by contrast, the self-certainty of the ego cogito as the indivisible 
                                                               
7 In this regard, Hadot speaks of “troubling analogies between the philosophical attitudes of 
antiquity and those of the Orient” that made him reconsider his initial suspicions towards 
comparative philosophy (Hadot 2002, 278). 
8 In a different context, Foucault had already contrasted what he calls the 
“philosophico-scientific standpoint of truth,” as a universal and demonstrative form of truth 
assumed to be accessible at any time and to be present everywhere, with a “more archaic” 
conception according to which the truth constitutes an event bound to specific places, times, 
people, and forms of existence. Such a “truth-event” is not readily available to any 
thinking/doubting subject, but rather has its own specific “geography,” “calendar,” and 
“chronology,” as well as “privileged and exclusive agents.” Such a form of truth then does not 
require a “method,” but rather a (practical, e.g. ritual) “strategy” in order to be experienced and 
grasped (see Foucault 2003, 236–38). 
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remainder of the radical methodological doubt of a conscious subject no longer 
obligates the latter to engage in a praxis of “care of the self” as the inevitable 
price to be paid for valuable knowledge. In the distinctive self-transparent clarity 
of thinking, the self can bracket out everything except itself, so that its “being” 
comes to concern the reflexivity and self-referentiality of indubitable thought 
alone. Conversely, the kind of truth available to a subject who knows by thinking 
and doubting as such is no longer assumed to have the potential of transforming 
the very mode of being of the subject in its entirety.9  
While Foucault emphasizes that he does not mean to read the Cartesian cogito 
ergo sum as a singular and instantaneous rupture in the history of philosophy, it 
can in his view still stand as the symbol of a more complex and gradual shift in 
the conception of the relation between subjectivity and truth. Leaving aside the 
fruitful potential of these insights for comparative philosophy at large within the 
limited scope of this short article, I will try to indicate below that such a 
“Cartesian moment” can be understood not only as a (partial and never fully 
completed) shift in the historical development of Western philosophy,10 nor 
necessarily constitutes the symptom of a categorical cultural divide between 
Western and Chinese thought, but also recurs within the work of an individual 
thinker such as the New Confucian philosopher Tang Junyi. 
3  Wisdom, Religious Practice, and Transcendental 
Subjectivity in the Work of Tang Junyi 
There are but a handful of texts and passages in Tang Junyi’s voluminous oeuvre 
which explicitly or systematically deal with the topic of “wisdom” (zhihui). As is 
the case with many other thinkers and scholars, Tang usually does not treat 
“wisdom” as an idea awaiting conceptual and historical analysis, but rather as 
self-explanatory enough to be directly employed in discussing the relation of 
various forms of knowledge, such as philosophy, science, and religion, to human 
existence in the contemporary world. That being said, the expectation that 
philosophy does not stop short at remaining a purely theoretical exercise in 
speculative prowess runs through the whole of Tang’s work and could be said to 
count as a basic stance shared in common by many of the thinkers currently 
classified as “New Confucian.” The gradual transformation of Confucianism into 
                                                               
9 For Hadot on the other hand, Descartes’s Mediations were still in a sense continuous with 
the practice of askēsis in ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy (see Hadot 2002, 263–65).  
10 As Foucault himself indicates, the tension between “philosophy” and “spirituality” runs 
through much of the history of continental philosophy from the 19th century to the present (see 
Foucault 2006, 28). 
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the academic discipline of philosophy (see Makeham 2012) did not lead 
traditionalist intellectuals such as Tang to abandon the normative requirement of 
striving for what Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) called the “unity of 
knowledge and action” (zhixing heyi 知行合一), but rather seems to have had the 
effect of reinforcing the demand that (philosophical) knowledge should maintain, 
and if necessary recover, its transformative capacity in modern society. 
In Tang’s writings, this demand expressed itself in the notion that 
Confucianism has to be reconstituted not only as philosophy, but also needs to 
become a religious “teaching” (jiao 教) objectively embodied in ritual practices 
and modes of conduct in everyday life which concern an individual’s entire 
(social) being. Accordingly, in order to qualify as a socially performative form of 
wisdom, the Confucian teachings should not merely be an object of knowledge 
(zhi 知), but also of belief (xin 信) (see Tang [1954a], Tang [1953b], 385–94 and 
Tang [1977], 14–16).11 Tang was convinced that Confucianism could begin to 
function as the basis for mutual tolerance and understanding between the world 
religions, precisely because it is not a religion in the strict or ordinary sense of 
the word, that is to say, had never been dogmatically oriented or fatally entangled 
with institutional structures of power, such as in the case of the Catholic Church 
(see Tang [1956], 280). Additionally, he believed that in the present age, only 
religious morality and philosophy as wisdom could ensure that the various 
specialized domains of knowledge are kept in check, reach across disciplinary 
boundaries, and overcome the epistemological as well as socio-political 
disintegration plaguing modern society. As such, the reassertion of a unified 
order of knowledge “governed by” (zhuzai 主宰) religious morality, which Tang 
sees as a continuation of the Chinese tradition, has a soteriological dimension 
and plays a crucial role in devising a universalistic “way to save the world” (jiu 
shijie zhi dao 救世界之道) that is no longer limited to a particular ethnicity, 
nationality, religious denomination, or social class (see Tang [1977], 667–68).  
It is important to point out that Tang’s insistence on the necessity of 
reactualizing Confucianism on the objective level of society and everyday life as 
a practical and practicable teaching is enmeshed with his own particular 
philosophical presuppositions, which are not straightforwardly continuous with 
traditional Confucianism, but rather betray the strong influence of German 
Idealism as a philosophy of transcendental subjectivity.12  In the following 
passage for instance, it becomes clear that there is a direct link between the 
capacity for transcendence and the unconditioned nature that Tang attributes to 
                                                               
11 For a comprehensive and historically sensitive analysis of the religious dimension of Tang’s 
thought, see Fröhlich (2017, 108–37). 
12 For more historical background and details, see Van den Stock (2016, 65–81, 247–66). 
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the mind on the one hand and the project of positively transforming human 
existence through religious practice on the other: 
 
It is only within the unlimitedness and transcendence with which the mind is 
endowed and within the human existence where the mind is located itself that 
human beings can find a place of repose and a ground to settle themselves and 
establish their lives. In order to do so, human beings must be able to possess a 
religious spiritual demand and religious belief as well as a form of religious 
morality and practice in which the unlimited and transcendent nature of the 
mind becomes manifest. (人只能在其涵具無限性、超越性之心靈，與此心所在
之人生存在自己，得其安頓之所時，人乃能得安身立命之地。此則待於人之能有
一表現其心靈之無限性、超越性之宗教的精神要求與宗教信仰，及宗教性之道德
與實踐。) (Tang [1956], 310) 
 
Interestingly enough then, Tang grounds the possibility of religion as an 
existential and transformative practice in what he calls the “requirement to 
transcend the world of actuality” (超越現實世界之要求). This movement of 
transcendence, of the mind recognizing its own autonomy and unconditioned 
(“unlimited”) nature vis-à-vis the objective world, is not conceived of as being 
directed towards an external, transcendent God as in Christianity, but as a 
movement in which “the self settles itself and establishes its own life” (自安此身，
自立此命) in the immanence and immediacy of self-awareness (Tang [1956], 316; 
Tang [1961], 152–53). In this sense, the kind of religious belief Tang is 
describing here necessarily contains a reflexive moment, namely what he calls “a 
great turning-around of mental activity” (心靈活動之大回頭), in which the mind 
gains self-confidence (zixin 自信) by coming to recognize its own existence as a 
“transcendental self and subject” (超越的自我主體) (Tang [1956], 312). “Turning 
around” towards the self coincides with an insight into the fact that the mind is 
irreducible to any of the cognitive activities or objects for which it constitutes the 
condition of the possibility. Additionally, this reflexive movement can serve to 
overcome conflicts between different types of knowledge such as religion and 
science by leading to a recognition that the latter are equally dependent on the 
self as a transcendental subject (Tang [1956], 288).  
Wisdom then is not merely a practical type of knowledge concerned with the 
specific situations and concrete circumstances encountered by particular human 
beings in everyday life, but also and above all requires the capacity to synthesize 
(zonghe 綜合) the particular, that is to say, to conceptually subordinate the 
particular to the universal (see Tang ([1962], 4–6, 21–23, 33–34). Wisdom, 
religious belief, transcendental subjectivity, and the turn towards and 
transformation of human existence are thus joined together in a complex and 
dialectical manner that should keep us from simplistically conceiving of 
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“wisdom” as the privileged property of the Chinese philosophical tradition. 
Rather, in Tang Junyi’s work, the turn towards existence and religious-moral 
practice (“care of the self”) is closely linked with reflexive self-knowledge, in the 
specific sense of an insight into the transcendental position of the mind. 
4  Wisdom as Transformative Experience and 
Transcendental Reflexivity in Tang’s Philosophy 
Crucially, these seemingly speculative considerations have a determinate 
historical background and significance. For Tang, the challenge faced by 
Confucianism in the modern world can be summarized as the task of restoring 
the gap between “inner” and “outer,” that is to say, of revealing the continuity 
between the Confucian “spirit of returning to seek it in oneself” (反求諸己的精神) 
(Mencius 4A4) and the merely apparent externality of the institutional 
(“democracy”) and epistemological (“science”) requirements of modernity, the 
latter being internal to and not detached from the religious process of moral 
self-cultivation and self-transformation in Confucianism (see Tang [1957], 
246–54). This conception is meant as a corrective to the putative neglect of the 
external and objective dimensions of social life in Song-Ming thought (Tang 
[1957], 256–57). “The most important kind of wisdom we need,” Tang writes,  
 
consists in recognizing the significance of the fact that all of the seemingly 
outwardly directed instead of internally oriented forms of cultural life in 
modern society can help us unravel the kind of entanglements and shackles 
described in the above and in recognizing that they appear to run counter to, 
but actually serve to complete, the spirit of returning to seek it in oneself. (吾
人所需之最重要的智慧，則是在認識一切表面看來是向外而非反求之各種現代社
會文化生活，可幫助我們解開前述之糾結系縛的意義，其與反求諸己的精神，似
相反而相成的意義。) (Tang [1957], 247) 
 
The “internality” to which we are called upon to return here designates both the 
self as an individual as well as the mind as such, insofar as the latter is endowed 
with a faculty of transcendence which allows human beings to “absorb the 
external into the internal” (yi nei she wai 以內攝外) (Tang [1957], 256) and 
thereby reclaim what at first appear to be objective barriers to leading an 
authentic moral life in modern society. In turn, this obliges the subject to 
cultivate an ability to “withdraw from the external world into the interiority of 
my own self” ( 從 外 面 的 世 界，撤 退 於 我 自 己 之 內 ). By temporarily and 
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strategically maintaining a certain “coldness” towards the world, the subject can 
acquire and maintain the “spiritual coalescence” (精神的凝聚) necessary to 
recognize itself in the external social world, which ultimately constitutes a 
modality of its own essence as a moral and spiritual subject. Tang invokes the 
traditional saying that “the greatest hermits retreat into the city” (da yin yin yu shi
大隱隱於市 ) in order to make clear that such a “withdrawal” has to be 
accomplished within the hustle and bustle of daily modern life itself.  
The dialectical nature of this whole process becomes even more obvious when 
Tang goes on to argue that “the most important kind of wisdom” required in the 
contemporary age also involves consciously embracing the cold and objectifying 
gaze of modern science and philosophy, as forms of knowledge that he at other 
instances, following Xiong Shili 熊十力  (1885−1968), directly opposed to 
wisdom (Van Den Stock 2016, 221–34). By recognizing the value of science and 
philosophy as “instruments to stabilize external stimuli” (貞定外面的刺激的工具), 
the subject can accomplish a “turning around” (回頭) towards itself and come to 
realize that the distance introduced between the subject and the object by 
scientific and philosophical reasoning, and conceptual analysis as such, is 
instrumental in accomplishing the transformative process of “seeking it in 
oneself” on a social level in the long run (Tang [1957], 247–50).13 Here we find 
something very similar to Mou Zongsan’s dialectic of the “self-negation of 
intuitive moral knowledge” (liangzhi de ziwo kanxian 良知的自我坎陷). The 
constantly recurring motif of “turning around” refers both to the transcendental 
status of consciousness, as well as to the dialectical movement of the self 
(“inner”) recognizing itself in society (“outer”) as a precondition for moral 
self-cultivation under the conditions of modernity. Moreover, Tang’s “Cartesian” 
move from the immediacy of human experience to the reflexivity of 
consciousness is closely related to his attempt to come to terms with what he sees 
as the epistemological and socio-political peculiarities of modern society.  
However, as is arguably the case in the history of modern Western thought as 
well, this Cartesian moment does not constitute a singular and definitive rupture, 
but rather would seem to describe an unresolved tension running through the 
whole of Tang Junyi’s philosophy. In Tang’s earlier and hitherto largely 
unstudied writings,14 there is already a similar logic at work which foreshadows 
                                                               
13 At another instance, Tang explicitly relates “wisdom,” not to ageless knowledge, rootedness 
in history, and continuity with the past as one might expect, but rather with the ability to break 
free from established (conventions of) knowledge, with novelty, creativity, and youthfulness. 
See Tang ([1962], 43, 50–55). Also see Tang ([1953a], 215–83), where Tang is led by 
“Wisdom” as a ten-year old child in his encounters with various philosophers and religious 
figures. 
14 For a detailed study of Tang’s The Establishment of a Moral Self (Daode ziwo zhi jianli 道
德自我之建立) from 1944, see Fan (2000). 
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the complex relation between “knowing the self” and “taking care of the self” in 
his mature oeuvre. In The Experience of Human Existence (Rensheng zhi tiyan 
人生之體驗) from 1944, it soon becomes apparent that the early Tang does not 
approach truth in a propositional sense as an adequation of the subject to the 
object, but rather as an existential experience with a strong affective and 
transformative quality: 
 
There is no need to constantly go about analyzing truth through your 
speculative faculties; what the truth needs most is a profound form of 
experience and enjoyment. This means that the knowledge of the truth you 
obtain has to permeate your existence […] You can suck in the truth of the 
universe, like an infant suckling at the breast. (你不必處處用思辨力去分析真理，
真理最需要的是深心的體玩。這是說你所得之真理的知識，必須滲融於你之生活
中 […] 你可以吮吸宇宙之真理，如嬰兒之吮乳。) (Tang [1944a], 45)15  
 
“True wisdom,” Tang writes later on in these pages, “does not require a brain, 
but only eyes” (真正的智慧，是不要腦髓的，只要眼) (Tang [1944a], 268). He 
makes it clear that in writing this book, he is not trying to formulate a systematic 
theory of human existence in dialog with other philosophers. Rather, it was 
“written for the self” (為己寫的) and primarily deals his own private vexations, 
doubts, anxieties, and shortcomings, as well as with the problems besetting the 
path of spiritual progression and moral growth in a more literary and poetic 
fashion (Tang [1944a], 3, 9–10).16 What he is after in this context is wisdom, as 
a “radiance of the mind” (心靈的光輝) that is not to be sought for outside the self 
(Tang [1944a], 42). As such, The Experience of Human Existence is meant to 
have a “guiding function” (引導的作用) (Tang [1944a],118) for both the reader 
and the writer, and is filled with self-interrogations and admonitions calling upon 
the subject to change his life and way of thinking by “turning around and seeing 
yourself” (反身看你自己) (Tang [1944a], 111–14). Writing (and reading) The 
Experience of Human Life thus qualifies as a kind of “spiritual exercise” in its 
own right, albeit one of a relatively cerebral type.  
Although this work, which is mainly devoted to philosophically uncovering 
the latent moral value of seemingly amoral or even immoral forms of thought 
and behavior in personal everyday life, is still largely devoid of a socio-political 
dimension, the idea of “returning to the self” is already tied up with the ability of 
the mind to transcend the apparent limitations of the outside world in general and 
of being able to see that “the material world of external entities is a symbol of 
your own existential experiences” (外界事物之形色的世界，即是你自己生命經驗
                                                               
15 Cf. Tang [1957], 202. 
16 Cf. Tang ([ca. 1958], 50), Tang ([1944b], 1−3), and Tang ([1977], 676). 
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之象徵) (Tang [1944a], 130). Even though Tang claims that the beginning of 
philosophical wisdom consists in the realization that the self and the world are 
inseparably linked as respectively the subject (neng 能) and object (suo 所)17 of 
a unified form of direct experience and “pure apprehension” (chuncui de ganjue 
純粹的感覺),18 it is ultimately the reflexivity of the conscious mind which allows 
the latter to come out on top in the unity of the subjective and the objective.  
The ability of the mind to take itself for an object leads to the problem that the 
subject can never completely recover its self-identity and that an irreducible 
distance remains present within itself, as simultaneously the subject and object of 
reflexive thought. However, Tang sees this as a positive attribute and quality of 
the subject as a spiritual as opposed to material form of existence: “Matter can 
only be identical to itself and cannot become aware of itself, it cannot turn itself 
into two different selves […] The self-nature of matter does not hold the 
unlimited within itself” (物質只能是它自己，不能自覺它自己，不能化它自己為兩
自己 […] 物質之自性，不具藏著無限) (Tang [1944a], 141). The holistically 
sounding “mutual interpenetration” (huxiang shentou 互相渗透) of world and 
self that Tang envisages is thus accomplished within spirit as the privileged 
constituent and evolutionary apex of this unity (Tang [1944a], 155–61). When we 
take the subsequent development of Tang’s philosophy into account, it becomes 
apparent that the call to return to the self and the immediacy of human existence 
and experience was consistently coupled to a Cartesian insistence on the 
reflexivity of consciousness as the transcendental guarantee for autonomy in 
modernity. In this sense, “knowing the self” (the transcendental reflexivity of the 
subject) has become the condition of the possibility for “caring for the self” and 
realizing moral self-cultivation in the contemporary world.19 
                                                               
17 Tang ([1944a], 120). Tang probably adopted these Buddhist terms from Xiong Shili’s New 
Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin Weishi Lun 新唯識論).  
18 See Tang ([1944a], 125): “In pure apprehension, the white cloud you perceive is nothing but 
a pure lump of whiteness. You do not know that it is a white cloud, just as you do not know 
that it is white, because pure apprehension is an immediate and unified apprehension, which at 
first has nothing to do with what something is” (在純粹的感覺中．你所見的白雲．只是一單純
的白色之團。你不知它是白雲，亦不知它是白，因為純粹的感覺是突然的一感，最初並無所謂是
什麼). The influence of William James’s (1842−1910) concept of “pure experience” is obvious 
here. Also see Tang ([1954b], 563–64). 
19 As Pierre Hadot notes, such a transcendental recovery of self-knowledge in classical 
philosophy occurs in the closing lines of Husserl’s Cartesians Meditations as well: “The 
Delphic oracle’s gnothi seauton [know thyself] has acquired a new meaning. Positive science 
is a science lost in the world. One must first lose the world by the epochē [bracketing out] in 
order to regain it in a universal self-consciousness. Noli foras vie, says St. Augustine, in te redi, 
in interiore homine habitat veritas [Do not lose your way from without, return to yourself, it is 
in the inner man that truth dwells]” (qtd. in Hadot 2002, 65). 
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5  Concluding Remarks 
In the above, I have tried to argue that the relation between life/existence and 
knowledge/wisdom described as completely co-dependent and reciprocal in the 
quote I invoked at the begin of this article is constantly on the verge of collapsing 
into the self-sufficient reflexivity of consciousness in Tang Junyi’s writings. For 
Tang, wisdom is not simply a matter of practical experience, spiritual know-how, 
or existentially oriented knowledge, but also always involves a specific 
conception of subjectivity as the ultimate condition of the possibility for any 
ideal unification of knowledge and action within the specific conditions of 
modern society. As such, Tang’s Confucian project of spiritual 
self-transformation cannot be separated from his philosophical vision of the 
subject as irreducible to its empirical objects and external conditions, that is to 
say, from the transcendental position of subjectivity in a Kantian sense. In other 
words, the assertion of the transcendental status of the subject in relation to the 
immanent and factual world of experience runs parallel with his undertaking of 
arriving at a reintegration of the epistemological and broader institutional 
differentiation characteristic of modernity by restoring a universal form of 
religious morality to a dominant position. The transcendental status of the subject 
over and against the objective world it gives shape to is thus not simply a 
post-Kantian epistemological presupposition describing the overarching 
condition for gaining access to the truth, but also at the same time has a spiritual 
dimension in functioning as a guarantee for the universal applicability of 
“Confucian” religious practice. In this sense, the recurrent motif of the wise 
subject “turning back” and “seeking it in oneself” designates the turn from the 
insufficiency of the speculative endeavor of philosophy as an academic discipline 
to wisdom as a form of transformative spiritual practice in everyday life. At the 
same time however, it also refers to the seemingly opposite yet dialectically 
related movement in which the subject turns from the facticity of experience 
back towards itself as a transcendental locus free from the increasing 
contingency of traditional knowledge in modern society. 
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